Sahel events - a summary of recent jihadi developments
Al-Qaeda and IS at the gates of Niamey, Kouffa declares expansion plans into the Gulf of Guinea
JNIM arrives to Nigeria, closes the Benin-Nigeria border against IS's advance
Islamic State Greater Sahara appears in northern Nigeria, the casus of “Lakurawa” Central orders Al-Furqan to make way for expansion of Sahel province.
Islamic State Central's death rumours have been premature
Quickly reaching the end of 2024, the Sahel is a domain of intense fighting that has entered another phase with the addition of Niger, after the military rebellion last year caused a significant breach in security. The breach is now leaking to the extent that I wonder if Niger isn't on the fast track to becoming the leader in the grand junta collapse race, as some of you might have heard me mention from time to time on Twitter.
Burkina Faso, the forerunner of chaos, 40%, 50%, or even 60% of whose territory evades Captain Traore's rule, had been thought of as the country most likely to fall. The state survives, at great cost, through shady deals with the Russians performing a Preatorian Guard duties for the junta leader, Chinese/Iranian/Turkish armaments, and American financial support.
Its territories are now used for expansion that, grimly enough, is not even hidden by al-Qaeda in the Sahel's (JNIM) High Command but is advertised and even announced, as was recently the case in the conversation Wassim Nasr conducted with the number 2 of JNIM, the Fulani, Amadou Kouffa.
The man publicly states that expansion into Benin, Togo, Ghana, and other countries is inevitable without useless sugarcoating; however, he still insists that negotiations with the groups are possible under certain conditions. Increasing attacks in the north of Togo and Benin, showcased in October by JNIM's propaganda arm Zallaqa with a drone recording, suggest the consolidation of the jihadists’ strategy in that direction..
The creation of separate units and commands, including the recently created position of JNIM emir for Benin, is a source of concern and should be taken seriously by the whole ECOWAS.
As advised by me and Aleksander Olech (@AleksanderOlech) in our report on the Sahel (released later this week in English), the states in the Gulf of Guinea should be supported by the EU and NATO in a much greater capacity than they have been since the withdrawal of the French forces from the western Sahel to Chad, while still taking care of the locals’ agency and polishing the delicate political balance, which is so fragile amid the chaos and hostile actors who, like Russia, are regularly trying to exacerbate tensions. Some, like the Germans and the Italians are still present in Niger, and should be encouraged to keep the bridge open for the future.
With the Burkinabe military regime basically hiding in the capital, Ouagadougou, and protecting the roads to it, they can still, up to a certain point, limit the incoming flood by throwing badly equipped VDP militias into a meat-grinding swamp, forcing civilians to build fortifications as happened in Barsalogho, where an estimated 400-600 people may have been killed by JNIM, and bombing with Turkish-supplied drones, though the drones themselves are not as cheap a business as it's commonly thought. That is not the case with Niger.
As noted by Liam (BlueSky) from Critical Threats in one of his recent analyses, Niamey is located in an awkward place—just enough for both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to wave their hands at the gates and come back safely. These are not the literal gates, but they are significantly close for all monitors to raise the alarm. On January 12, JNIM forced their way 17 km from Niamey, attacking a gendarmerie post.
Later this year, the Islamic State succeeded in taking over the mega prison Koutoukale from the inside, with hundreds of inmates escaping and allegedly quite a few making it to ISGS territory. The prison facility is 50 km from Niamey.
Escaped prisoners of the Islamic State, including suspected emirs
The record though still belongs to JNIM, with the attack in Seno last month, on October 26, just 7 km to Niamey, showing comfort in conducting operations so close to the capital of Niger and triggering questions of junta's ability to prevent the worst in case of jihadists’ advance.
Spoils from the attack in Séno
JNIM - attack in Séno on a security checkpoint resulted in the death of at least one element, burning of a military vehicle and one weapon looted.
And, while the capital of Niger itself hasn't seen jihadi attacks this year, aside from some president Bazoum related tensions, the city has a history of being infiltrated by both Islamic State and AQIM. Islamic State Sahel, still under the command of ISWAP back then, conducted an assasination attempt in Niamey in 2021, targeting the home of a national assembly president, killing a guard.
AQIM themselves have conducted attacks or hostage taking operations in 2011 and 2013.
No doubt, cells have continued to exist there, as recent case of the first in almost a decade JNIM assault in Bamako indicates amid the Mali junta's, one of the three AES alliance members humiliation and will be important once either group decides to make things real in the country. Or both, because Niger is unlucky enough to have two more Islamic State provinces operating on its territory and that may be leveraged at a crucial moment.
Though it remains to be seen if, after the arrest of the Islamic State Libya wali earlier this year, the wilayat wasn't simply scrapped. This development is suggested by the additional responsibility the Islamic State has shifted to the al-Furqan office, with the Libya-based Army of Sahara now commanded by the Sahel-based Emir, a former ISWAP (Nigerian affiliate) commander, al-Mainuki.
Libya, once a powerful player in itself on the Islamic State map, has now been relegated to the role of a courier, a pipeline of recruits, illicit trading and foreign jihadists cross-border movements, with the last activity noted at the end of 2022, showcased by a pledge to the now deceased Caliph Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini.
It doesn't mean IS is not eager to still get involved in potential chaos in Libya amid another civil war brewing, as proven by the Islamic State Central themselves, a forgotten in media and analysis at large player that seems to have have their hands full in various events in Northern Africa, Gulf and Caucasus and Europe in recent two years.
Just last year, they tried to guide a teenager student to stage an attack with armed drones. The authorities later discovered instructions on the manufacturing of toxins and biological materials. Their apparent absence from media attention and the narrative of Islamic State Khorasan being the main player worldwide is therefore quite stretched, especially with the more time passed and new investigations seeing light of the day, including the events in Sahel. The Central's obsession with chemical and biological threats is also of concern.
Without delving too much into details there are three points of note in recent months that are key to understanding IS's plans and what may lie ahead in Niger for 2025.
*Zakat levied in record far locations near the border with Nigeria, confirmed by official stamps of IS Sahel province and local entrepreneurs receiving documents, attacks in Taihua
*Islamic State Central directing al-Furqan to set up cells in historical city of Sokoto and its region to facilitate cash transfers, weapons and militants.
*The issue of Lakurawa, and the suspicions of who they are
On September 3, social media in Niger got flooded with photos of suspicious men visiting villages in a close to Nigeria location somewhere south from Tahoua, where IS has been attacking Nigerien army regularly.
One of the photos included a document known to researchers of the Islamic State, with official Sahel wilayat credentials, showing zakat levied from pastoralists..
This indicates the confidence ISGS operates these days, while also signifying that swaths of territory from the border with Algeria to Nigeria is increasingly turning into a grey zone. Both repelling the migrant agreement with the European Union supposed to slow and managed human waves trying to reach Europe and soldiers relocated to administrative and policing tasks by the very nature of military regime creates gaps. Gaps exploited by terrorists everywhere, going as far as striking in unprecedented fashion at the Algeria-Niger border, the military checkpoint at Assamaka.
Source with permission thanks to @julesdhl at julesduhamel.com
Even maps from earlier this year already showed ISGS connecting with Nigerian border. That further deepens later, with new events that even made the Nigerian military take a closer look and issue a statement.
We need to have it in mind, that it's clear JNIM has been planning to prevent anything IS Greater Sahara could possibly decide on. Therefore whenever ISGS makes a move towards Nigeria, JNIM also does the same. It's now apparent, that IS has lost most of access to vital ground at WAP complex in Burkina Faso, currently likely completely under the JNIM control. It enables not only aforementioned increase in attack quantity on Benin, but above all the bridge to Nigeria. Just yesterday, JNIM informed of an8 attack in Ghūyū, Dosso province (translation thanks to Pieter van Ostaeyen), marking efforts to deepen influence just below ISGS's advance.
Advance that also has a clear direction - Sokoto, the famous city important for jihadist messaging. A former capital of the historical Sokoto Caliphate, a bona fide jihadi sultanate of the Fulanis, is now the key for both terror groups to establish their presence.
In fact, earlier this summer, we saw the warnings of jihadists from the Islamic State arriving from the Sahel. That was later confirmed by the UN monitoring team in their findings. According to the reports, Islamic State Central directed al-Furqan to bolster ISGS's advance from western Niger and establish cells in Sokoto, that would enable the two wilayats to connect. The UN report also noted that Sokoto is the key facilitator network, but other teams had been spread within the whole Sokoto state.
That inevitably makes us arrive to the ongoing in the Nigerian media debate of so-called “Lakurawa”. The concept itself is indeed not new. In different forms has been called out since at least 2018 and mentioned at various intervals. By looking at the time of different research dates, I think it's safe to consider that the loudest news of their presence were two dates - 2018 and 2024.
Murtala Rufa’i, James Barnett, and Abdulaziz Abdulazi have conducted a research that the Nigerian media have picked up to deny that the group is linked to ISGS, but instead would have to be presented as another al-Qaeda offshot, Ansaru, that indeed has been active in the area after joining JNIM (as explained by Caleb Weiss here).
The problem however is the fact that noone seems to have asked the authors, especially James, what do they think about this case. He recently confirmed the initial findings from 2022 may have been a little off and indeed, pointed to Islamic State Sahel instead, corroborated with his consultations with local communities. They shouldn't be admonished for that - as previously stated, al-Qaeda is also making large steps visible as we speak, and the presence of light-skinned jihadists from Mali must be confusing to differentiate without strong evidence at hand. Both groups’ modus operandi can sometimes interconnect when they test the ground to determine the possibility of advance.
Nobody from the locals would care who they truly are, until something turned wrong, since they were happy to have the jihadists’ secure their homes against the massive problem of bandits. That has unfortunately changed, with both JNIM's and IS's both provinces pressuring Sokoto and Kebbi at the border with Benin and introducing their interpretation of sharia law. In 2019, the UN monitoring team for the first time noted the presence of IS Sahel in Sokoto, likely connected to the arrival of “Lakurawas”.
The signs were there and with the Sahel war only growing in sheer size, more is to come. It remains to be seen, what steps will the two groups make, but one thing is clear - with the Niger and Benin in trouble, no way Nigeria won't get a significant backlash. And it's time to adress it right now. Leaving the Islamic State alone for so long is likely to backfire in not so far future, given the amount of possibilites that may open soon.
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